Fake News Among the Ukrainian Diaspora: What the Evidence Shows

Australia is home to one of the larger Ukrainian diaspora communities in the Southern Hemisphere, with strong concentrations in Sydney's western suburbs and Melbourne's inner west. As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, these communities have become both targets and active participants in debates about truth and propaganda. A new study coordinated by the Free Press Foundation, with fieldwork in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, looks at how fabricated stories move through Ukrainian-speaking networks abroad.

The findings matter for Australian readers because misinformation rarely stops at the border. Material fabricated in Russian-language Telegram channels often reaches community WhatsApp groups, then local ethnic media, and sometimes mainstream outlets. Understanding the pathways helps newsrooms, educators, and regulators respond more precisely than blanket warnings would.

How the research was carried out

The project ran for fourteen months and combined online surveys, in-depth interviews, and a content audit of Ukrainian-language social channels consumed in Australia. Researchers partnered with Ukrainian community organisations in Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, which helped them reach first-, second-, and third-generation respondents. A control sample of non-Ukrainian Australian social media users was included for comparison.

Participants were asked to identify stories they had seen, believed, and forwarded. The team then traced each story back to its original source. Roughly 38 percent of forwarded items originated on Telegram or VKontakte, with the remainder split between Facebook, YouTube, and closed messaging apps. The methodology is consistent with broader work on combating Russian disinformation published by the foundation earlier this year.

Where misinformation spreads fastest

Encrypted messaging apps emerged as the dominant vector. WhatsApp and Telegram group chats, often organised around local community events, prayer meetings, or Saturday schools, were the most cited channels for receiving questionable content. Public Facebook pages came second, especially among older users who treat the platform as a community noticeboard.

YouTube recommendation algorithms also played a role. Several respondents described how a single search for Ukrainian news led them into a rabbit hole of channels that mixed genuine reporting with conspiracy content about biolabs, NATO, or staged atrocity footage. The pattern mirrors what ACMA has documented in its reviews of foreign interference risks on digital platforms operating in Australia.

Generational and language divides

Age and language fluency were the strongest predictors of susceptibility. First-generation migrants who rely on Ukrainian-language sources were more likely to encounter raw propaganda before it was debunked in English. Younger respondents, many of whom consume news primarily in English through SBS or Australian outlets, were more sceptical of sensational claims but sometimes dismissive of nuance.

Language itself became a barrier to correction. Fact-checks published in English rarely reached the Telegram groups where the original rumours spread. Respondents asked for short, translated summaries that could be shared directly inside family chats, an insight that aligns with studies of multicultural media consumption patterns in Sydney and Melbourne.

Trusted voices inside the community

Despite the spread of fake stories, the research identified a strong counterforce: local clergy, Ukrainian schoolteachers, and long-standing community radio hosts. These figures were widely trusted and frequently cited as the first stop when a story seemed suspicious. Community-run outlets such as the Ukrainian Weekly in Melbourne and online channels in Brisbane played a similar role.

Trust, however, does not automatically translate to reach. Many of these trusted voices have small audiences and limited resources, while disinformation networks operate at scale. The foundation argues that strengthening local journalism is the most sustainable response, a theme explored in detail in investigative journalism in Ukraine coverage.

Comparing diaspora groups in Australia

The Ukrainian experience is not unique. The table below summarises findings from parallel research among Greek, Vietnamese, and Russian-speaking diaspora communities across Australia, drawn from comparable survey instruments.

The data suggests that platforms matter as much as content. Russian-speaking respondents reported the highest weekly exposure, in part because raw Russian-language state media is still accessible within Australian diaspora networks, even after ACMA restrictions on RT and Sputnik.

What communities and newsrooms can do

The findings point to a set of practical steps that Australian stakeholders can take in the coming year.

• Fund short-form Ukrainian-language fact-checks that can be shared directly inside WhatsApp and Telegram groups.
• Train Ukrainian Saturday school teachers in Melbourne and Sydney to spot and debunk viral claims.
• Partner with SBS to translate weekly misinformation round-ups into Ukrainian, Russian, and English.
• Encourage Australian editors covering Ukraine to cite diaspora community sources, not only wire copy.
• Support investigative reporting that traces specific disinformation campaigns back to their origins.
• Build shared monitoring tools so ethnic media outlets can flag emerging rumours quickly.
• Engage with the ACMA misinformation code to ensure it reflects the realities of multicultural audiences.

For a moment of levity, the rules of baseball versus cricket can illustrate how shared stories get rewritten for new audiences, since both games involve bats, bases, and runners, yet each diaspora tells the story differently. The same dynamic shapes how news travels across language and distance, and how a rumour about a wartime event can land very differently in a Parramatta family chat than in a Lviv group thread.